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Tax Me, But Spend Wisely? Sources of Public Finance
and Government Accountability
By Lucie Gadenne∗
Existing evidence suggests that extra grant revenues lead to little
improvements in public services in developing countries - but would
governments spend tax revenues differently? This paper considers
a program that invests in the tax capacity of Brazilian municipali-
ties. Using variations in the timing of program uptake I find that
it raises local tax revenues and that the increase in taxes is used
to improve both the quantity and quality of municipal education
infrastructure. In contrast increases in grants over which munic-
ipalities have the same discretion as over taxes have no impact
on any measure of local public infrastructure. These results sug-
gest that the way governments are financed matters: governments
spend increases in tax revenues more towards expenditures that
benefit citizens than increases in grant revenues.
JEL: D72,D73,H20,H77
I. Introduction
The idea that increases in tax revenues go hand in hand with more accountable
and efficient public spending is at the heart of interpretations of the emergence
of representative governments in the West (North and Weingast, 1989, Lindert,
2003). Whether increasing the capacity to tax of governments in today’s de-
veloping countries would have a similar effect is an open question. It is also
an important one as more public investments in infrastructure are necessary to
further the economic development of these countries (Duflo, 2011).
The large literature looking at the consequences of increases in government
revenues in developing countries is disappointing in this respect: it typically finds
that they have little impact on public health, education or social infrastructure
and are often wasted or diverted.1 A common trait of studies in this literature
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ciech Kopczuk, Karen Macours, Magne Mogstad, Thomas Piketty, Imran Rasul, Monica Singhal, Joel
Slemrod, Ernesto Stein, Eric Verhoogen and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya for their helpful comments as well as
Fernanda Brollo, Stephan Litschig, Tommaso Nannicini and Yves Zamboni for sharing their data, Marce-
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1For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) show that schools in Uganda receive only a small share
of funds allocated to them by the central government, Olken (2007) estimates that more than 20% of
grants that local governments in Indonesia receive to finance road projects are diverted, and Svensson
(2000) finds some evidence that aid increases corruption in politically divided countries.
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however is that they consider variations in non-tax revenues, possibly because
variations in tax revenues that are unrelated to other determinants of public
spending are particularly hard to come by.
This paper first asks whether increases in governments’ capacity to tax have a
positive impact on the provision of public infrastructure in the context of Brazil-
ian municipalities. To do this I study a program that helps municipalities increase
their tax revenues by subsidizing investments in local tax administrations. I con-
sider whether the program increased local tax revenues and whether the extra
revenue generated were spent on improving local public services. Participation to
the tax-capacity program is voluntary but the particular timing of its implemen-
tation enables me to estimate its causal impact on outcomes: local governments
decide when to apply to the program but the date at which they start it is deter-
mined by constraints faced by the supplier of the program. This makes it possible
to separately identify the impact of the program from a potential selection effect.
I then consider whether local governments spend these tax revenues differently
from non-tax (transfer) revenues. Variations in non-tax revenues come from a
rule determining how much federal transfers municipalities receive, as also used
by Litschig and Morrison (2013) and Brollo et al. (2013).2 The rule specifies that
transfer revenues increase discontinuously with local population size at 14 popu-
lation thresholds, so identification of the impact of transfer revenues comes from
municipalities that cross these thresholds over time. I compare how governments
spend increases in tax and transfer revenues using a 14 years panel dataset on
municipal revenues and expenditure outcomes, primarily the quality and quantity
of locally funded public education infrastructure.
Brazilian local governments are a good context in which to ask whether gov-
ernments spend tax revenues differently from non-tax revenues for several rea-
sons. First, municipalities control a significant share of public revenues (roughly
one-fifth) and are responsible for key public expenditures. Their main spend-
ing responsibility, and the main expenditure outcome I consider, is education,
an area in which Brazil’s performance is generally considered disappointing com-
pared to countries at similar levels of development (Ferraz, Finan and Moreira,
2012). Municipalities are in charge of primary education and shoulder much of
the blame for this; there is both scope and need for more local investments in ed-
ucation. Second, local governments have the same discretion over the allocation
of the transfer revenues considered here as over their own tax revenues, so there
are no legal or administrative reasons for the two being spent differently. Third,
there is evidence that Brazilian local governments do not use increases in non-tax
revenues to improve local infrastructure but instead waste or divert it (Caselli
and Michaels, 2013, Ferraz and Monteiro, 2010, Brollo et al., 2013).3 Asking
whether tax revenues are similarly wasted or diverted is particularly relevant in
2See also Corbi, Papaioannou and Surico (2014).
3An important exception is Litschig and Morrison (2013) who find that these same grants also lead
to better education outcomes in the 1980s. I discuss their results in detail below.
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this context.
I find that the program is successful in raising local tax revenues: a 1 Real
investment in tax capacity leads to an annual increase in tax revenues of roughly
1 Real per year after 5 years. Moreover, the increase in tax revenues generated
by the program leads to a 4 to 5% increase in the quantity of municipal education
infrastructure and an improvement in an index of the quality of the infrastructure
of one-tenth of a standard deviation. I find some evidence that literacy rates in-
crease slightly in municipalities that take part in the program, in line with results
in Harbison and Hanushek (1992) and Gomes Neto and Harbison (1996) which
suggest increases in education infrastructure improve students’ outcomes in this
context, though results lack robustness. An increase in transfer revenues of the
same size has no impact on education infrastructure. I then consider alternative
uses of public revenue. Neither tax nor transfer revenues have a significantly pos-
itive impact on municipal health infrastructure. Some evidence on what transfer
revenues are spent on is found in Brollo et al. (2013) who show that they lead to
an increase in corruption. In contrast I find evidence suggesting that tax revenues
have no impact on corruption.
To interpret these results as evidence that governments spend revenues from
different sources differently one must rely on stronger assumptions than those
required to interpret the estimates of the impacts of both tax and transfer revenues
as causal. My main estimates are obtained on different groups of municipalities
so we must assume that municipalities taking part in the tax capacity program
and those affected by the transfer allocation rule do not have different marginal
propensities to spend on education, health and corruption out of all types of
public revenues. Whilst this assumption cannot be tested, I show two pieces
of reassuring evidence. First, results are the same when I restrict the sample
to the (small) group of municipalities that take part in the program and are
affected by the transfer allocation rule. Second, the particular design of this
rule - it creates 14 different points in the distribution of municipalities at which
the local impact of transfer revenues can be estimated - allows me to consider
whether the marginal propensity to spend transfer revenues varies with observable
municipal characteristics. I find no evidence of such variation. In particular I show
that municipalities that look extremely similar to those that enrolled in the tax
capacity program do not spend their transfer revenues differently.
Several models of public resources allocation could explain this result. I find
some evidence that the difference between how tax and transfer revenues are
spent is smaller in municipalities where there is a local radio station potentially
informing citizens about public budgets. This is in line with principal-agent
models of public finance in which asymmetries of information allow politicians
to capture more rents (Besley and Smart, 2007) if we assume that citizens are
better informed about increases in taxes than increases in transfers. I discuss
and look for evidence of other mechanisms that could lead to tax revenues being
spent differently from transfer revenues and show that the results are unlikely to
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be due to different characteristics of the tax and transfer variations studied here
that are not necessarily related to their source (predictability, size and sign of the
variations in revenues).
This paper contributes to the literature on public finance in developing countries
in two ways. First, by evaluating the impact of a tax capacity program I present
estimates of the returns to investment in tax capacity. Second, this paper is to
the best of my knowledge one of the first to consider the impact of tax revenues
on publicly provided infrastructure. One recent exception is a paper by Martinez
(2016) who compares how local governments in Colombia spend local tax revenues
and revenues from oil royalties and finds that increases in tax revenues have a
positive effect on the provision of public services, suggesting the results found
for Brazil in this paper may hold in other contexts. The idea that the growth of
states’ capacity to tax is an important covariate of economic development (Besley
and Persson, 2009) motivates a growing literature that studies the determinants
of tax compliance in developing countries.4 My results suggest that part of the
correlation between tax capacity and economic development can be interpreted
as causal as I show that governments that tax more also invest more in human
capital infrastructure.
The results are closely related to the literature which considers whether the
way governments are financed affects their behavior. Fisman and Gatti (2002)
establish a positive relationship between the proportion of US states’ revenues
derived from federal transfers and the number of convictions of public employ-
ees for abuse of public office. Similarly Zhuravskaya (2000) provides evidence
that outcomes affected by public policy improve when Russian cities keep more
of their tax revenues.5 I build on these previous findings by using variations in
tax and non-tax revenue that stem from clearly identified sources and consider-
ing variations in publicly provided infrastructure that are directly controlled by
governments.6
This paper speaks more generally to the larger literature on the political econ-
omy of public good provision (see Banerjee, Hanna and Mullainathan (2013) and
Olken and Pande (2012) for recent reviews). I focus on the impact on public
good provision of one institutional characteristic - government’s capacity to tax
- which has so far not been studied.7 Relatedly, these findings also contribute to
4See for example de Paula and Scheinkman (2010), Olken and Singhal (2011), Carrillo, Emran and
Aparicio (2011), Kumler, Verhoogen and Fras (2015), Pomeranz (2015), Best et al. (2015), Naritomi
(2015), Khan, Khwaja and Olken (2015), Cage´ and Gadenne (2015).
5See also Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009).
6There is also a large literature devoted to explaining the fly-paper effect, the fact that a dollar
received by a community in the form of a grant to its government results in greater public spending than
a dollar increase in community (private) income - see for example Knight (2002), Singhal (2008), Dahlby
(2011). The results presented here suggest that increases in private income could nevertheless improve
public infrastructure more than increases in grant income if they lead to higher tax revenues.
7The results are also consistent with the literature on the natural resource curse which finds that
governments’ revenues from the exploitation of natural resources are typically are wasted or diverted
(Van der Ploeg, 2011). One explanation for this empirical regularity is that resource-rich countries have
little need to levy taxes and therefore respond to their citizens’ demands.
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debates on how to finance development. The idea that aid revenues may not be
spent as well as tax revenues has long been discussed by policy practitioners and
researchers alike (OECD, 2010a, Besley and Persson, 2011, Deaton, 2013) but
technical aid on revenue-raising management has always been the poor cousin of
official development aid (OECD, 2010b). This paper shows that a resource mobi-
lization program in place in Brazil for nearly two decades has been successful in
providing long term sources of funds to local governments. It suggests that techni-
cal help in tax capacity building may lead to an increase in government resources
which is more conducive to public investments in human capital than traditional
budget-support development aid. Finally this paper speaks to debates regarding
the optimal form of decentralization in developing countries (see Gadenne and
Singhal (2014) for a review) by considering whether revenue decentralization -
increasing local government’s capacity to tax - affects public delivery outcomes
for a given level of administrative and expenditure decentralization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the context of study,
the tax and transfer policies of interest and the data used. Section 3 provides
a conceptual framework to formalize the hypotheses of interest and section 4
describes the empirical strategy I use to test them. Section 5 presents the main
results regarding the impact of the tax and transfer policies, and finally section 6
attempts to compare how local governments spend revenues from different sources
and discusses potential mechanisms for the results.
II. Context and data
A. Local expenditure responsibilities
The Brazilian constitution devolves substantial expenditure and revenue raising
responsibilities to the country’s more than 5,000 local governments. Mayors and
local councils, elected every 4 years, are in charge of allocating one-fifth of all
public spending. This paper focuses on different types of local public expenditure
variables which are all inputs in the production of human capital. Municipali-
ties report how they allocate their spending amongst budget items but reported
spending is known to be weakly, if at all, correlated with actual spending on local
infrastructure (see for example Caselli and Michaels (2013)). I therefore consider
measures of inputs directly financed by local governments that are not reported
by municipal authorities. I mostly study inputs not human capital outcomes be-
cause the hypothesis of interest relate to how governments choose to allocate their
revenues and because of data limitations: there is no measure of outcomes at the
local level measured in a consistent way over the years 1998 to 2011.8 Inputs also
react faster to local policy choices than outcomes; using these measures maximizes
the probability that we will see an impact of local revenues on outcomes.
8Data on school dropouts is available annually only until 2006, some data on students’ learning
outcomes is available from 2007. Data on literacy rates is only available in population census years, ie
once per decade. I provide some limited evidence using data from the 2000 and 2010 census below.
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The main measure of public expenditure outcomes I consider is municipal edu-
cation infrastructure. Education is the largest local budget item (it represents a
third of municipal expenditures on average) and local governments are in charge
of pre-primary and primary schools: they provide infrastructure, school lunch-
es and transportation and hire and pay teachers. Physical school infrastructure
is the type of local education input that is the most likely to be under-funded:
municipalities receive federal grants earmarked for expenditures on school staff,
school lunches or school transport but not for physical teaching infrastructure.9I
therefore focus on physical school infrastructure as the type of input that is the
most likely to be affected by changes in non-earmarked revenues but also dis-
cuss results for school employees. There is ample anecdotal evidence that the
supply of municipal education infrastructure has not kept up with the increase
in demand over the past two decades in Brazil (OECD, 2011)10. Furthermore,
there is causal evidence that increases in both the quantity and quality of educa-
tion infrastructure have a positive impact on student achievements in developing
countries11 and some evidence in Harbison and Hanushek (1992) and Gomes Neto
and Harbison (1996) that physical school infrastructure has a positive impact on
student performance in Brazil. Similarly Ferraz, Finan and Moreira (2012) show
that test scores are lower in municipalities with worse-equipped schools due to
corruption. I complement the study of education inputs by looking at the one
measure of education levels available at the municipal level in both the 2000 and
2010 Brazilian population census: literacy rates for inhabitants aged 5-9, 10-14
and 15-19.
I use panel data on the quantity and quality of municipal education infras-
tructure from the annual school census conducted by the Ministry of Education.
I consider the number of classrooms in use in municipal schools per thousand
school-age inhabitants to measure the quantity of municipal education infrastruc-
ture available at the lowest level of disaggregation possible. I combine the eight
variables related to the quality of the infrastructure that are measured consistent-
ly over the period (number of municipal schools with computers, with internet,
with a sports facility, a library, television/video equipment and connected to the
sewage and electricity systems) using principal component analysis to construct
a quality index.
I turn to two other expenditure outcomes to complement the results on educa-
tion: health infrastructure and corruption. Health is the second largest municipal
budget item comprising just under a quarter of local expenditures on average.
Local governments share responsibility for most of the infrastructure of prima-
960% of the largest education grant, FUNDEB, must fund teacher’s salaries. The PNAE grant funds
school lunches, the PNATE grant school transportation.
10A recent PISA study argues that lack of infrastructure is the main reason for one of the major
challenges of primary education in Brazil (OECD, 2011). It further shows that municipalities that
successfully improved local education outcomes often did so by investing in new school infrastructure.
11See for example Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) for evidence on the role of classrooms, Banerjee et al.
(2007) for evidence on the role of computers in classrooms, and a review in Glewwe and Kremer (2006).
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ry and preventive health units through the Family Health Program with state
governments, so health infrastructure could also be affected by changes in local
revenues. Data on the number of municipal health units come from a census of
health facilities conducted in 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2009.
Information on proxies for municipal corruption levels is available since the s-
tart of a federal anti-corruption program in 2003. Since then every six months
local governments are randomly chosen through a public lottery to be audited
by staff of the independent audit agency Controladoria-Geral da Unia˜o (CGU).
They audit the use of earmarked grants received by municipalities by collecting
administrative documents, interviewing citizens and conducting random checks
in municipal agencies. Ferraz and Finan (2011a) estimate using the audit reports
that 8% of audited revenues were diverted in the period 2001-2003. Several teams
have coded the reports for different time periods and samples of municipalities; I
consider both the indexes compiled by Brollo et al. (2013) for the 925 municipali-
ties with less than 50,000 inhabitants audited over the period 2003-2008 and those
constructed by Litschig and Zamboni (2012) for the 862 municipalities audited
between 2003 and 2006. The corruption dataset is a repeated cross-section of
municipalities.12Data on alternative uses of funds (such as debt reduction, local
police, municipality sewage light and transport systems) is not available.
B. Local public revenues
1. The tax policy
The tax capacity (PMAT) program. — Brazilian local governments are in
charge of collecting and setting the rates of two main local taxes, a service tax
and an urban property tax. Local tax revenues represent 13% of total tax revenues
on average, roughly 2% of GDP. Anecdotal evidence suggests local administra-
tions have little capacity to enforce tax payments. Municipal staff have outdated
tax registers, little institutional memory and weak methods to accurately assess
tax liabilities; high costs of understanding and paying taxes combined with low
penalties of getting caught lead many citizens to non-compliance. Some local of-
ficials have publicly admitted to tolerating a situation of permanent tax amnesty
where tax arrears are never recovered (Afonso and Araujo, 2006, BNDES, 2002).13
The Programa de Modernizac¸a˜o da Administrac¸a˜o Tributa`ria (PMAT program)
was launched in 1998 by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to remedy
12Allocating a date to the audit data is complicated. Auditors are typically supposed to audit the
use of federal grants over the last two-three years but sometimes report irregularities that occurred five
years ago. Moreover the date at which the irregularity occurred is often not specified in the reports -
possibly because it can be hard to pin down. In my main specification I say that an irregularity measure
corresponds to the year of the lottery if the audit took place in June of that year or later, I also consider
what happens when an irregularity is allocated to a date one or two years prior to the lottery as a
robustness check.
13A study of property tax collection in Brazil’s largest metropolitan areas estimates for example that
over 40% of urban property is not registered with the tax authorities (de Carvalho, 2006).
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this situation and increase municipalities’ tax revenues. It provides local govern-
ments with subsidized loans to invest in modernizing their tax administration in
order to improve their tax capacity.14 Expenditures financed by the loans can
be divided in three categories. First, municipalities improved their capacity to
gather information on potential taxpayers by updating tax registers and invest-
ing in skills and software to analyze and cross-check administrative data. Second,
they increased their capacity to enforce tax payments through streamlining au-
dit processes and recovering tax arrears. Third, they lowered taxpayers’ costs of
complying by multiplying the means and frequency of tax payments and simpli-
fying their interactions with the authorities. The paper’s web appendix discusses
evidence on the actions financed by the program.
The timing of the program is of particular interest. Selection in the program
is voluntary; municipalities choose when to apply and I observe applications that
occur between 1998 and 2009. They then wait between a couple of months and
four years to receive their first loan (all eventually obtain their first loan). We
see from Figure 1 that the distribution of application dates over time is smoother
than that of start dates which bunches around a few years. This is due to changes
in the conditions in which the program was supplied as the resources allocated
to review applications varied over time. The BNDES processed all applications
itself for the first 3 years and took over 2 years on average to authorize a project.
In 2002 most of the application process was contracted out to the public bank
Banco do Brasil whose involvement initially greatly accelerated the process until
it decided to cut down resources allocated to the program in 2005. This explains
the large spike in the number of municipalities starting the program in 2002, 2003
and 2004. In 2007 another public bank, Caixa General was contracted to help
with the administrative backlog.
Municipalities apply and start the program in the same order, suggesting there
was little they could do to shorten their waiting time. The timing of the pro-
gram’s implementation implies that municipalities choose when to apply but the
date at which they start the program (start receiving the loan) is largely out of
their hands. Controlling for the timing of municipalities’ selection into the pro-
gram will help identify its impact, as I explain below.
Understanding selection in the program. — 339 municipalities (hereafter
PMAT municipalities) start a program between 1999 and 2009.15 To understand
which factors determine selection into the program I estimate a hazard model of
the probability of applying. The main reason invoked by public officials to explain
their decision to join the program is that they thought their tax collection was
14The municipality’s future FPM transfers (see below) are used as collateral for the loan: should a
municipality fail to pay back its loan the BNDES has the power to block payment of FPM transfers. All
loans have been repaid fully.
15These cover roughly 40% of the Brazilian population.
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below potential. I therefore include a set of variables measured prior to the
start of the program (1998) that proxy for potential tax collection: GDP per
capita, population size, the share of services in GDP (a proxy for the tax base of
the service tax) and the share of urban population (a proxy for the tax base of
the urban property tax).16 I also include distance to the 10 closest municipalities
already in the program to proxy for potential information about the program: the
BNDES did little advertising and participants often told me they found out about
the program from observing neighboring municipalities implementing it. Results
are presented in Table 1. Richer, bigger and more urban municipalities, and those
with more neighbors already in the program, are as expected more likely to apply
to the program. When controlling for these variables PMAT municipalities did
not levy more taxes in 1998.
Local governments could also have applied because they had a higher than
average need for public revenues. I find no evidence that municipalities apply
when they have less municipally-provided health and education infrastructure.
Political considerations seem to play a role. Mayors in their second (last) term
are less likely to apply perhaps because they anticipate that the program’s full
impact on revenues may take more than one term (four years) to materialize. In
column 2 I restrict the sample to the post 2001 period for which information on
the mayor’s education is available. More educated mayor apply more often and
may be better at both collecting tax revenues and providing local infrastructure
so I consider specifications using only variations within a mayor’s time in office
below.
Applying to the program could finally be a response to economic or politi-
cal shocks, for example a local recession that depresses tax revenues. Whether
program participation is driven by time-varying shocks is important to the sub-
sequent analysis as I exploit variations in program participation across time and
space for identification. One of the main threats to the validity of this approach
is the existence of time-varying unobserved covariates that are correlated with
program participation, tax collection or expenditure outcomes. The assumption
that there are no such covariates cannot be tested but the existence of a corre-
lation with observed time-varying covariates would cast doubt on its plausibility.
Column 3 therefore tests whether shocks influenced program participation by in-
cluding lagged changes in tax revenue per capita, GDP per capita and population
per capita; column 4 considers whether municipalities’ decision to join was driven
by different trends prior to 1998. None of the lagged variables have an impact
and there is no evidence of different pre-1998 trends.
2.The transfer policy
16See the web appendix for a description of the variables and their source. 1998 was a recession year
in Brazil so municipal GDP and tax revenues may have been particularly low in that year. Using 1996
tax and GDP data instead does not affect the results.
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The most important source of municipal public revenue (30%) is the Fundo de
Participac¸a˜o dos Munic´ıpios (FPM), a transfer from the federal government es-
tablished by the Constitution. I focus on this transfer for two reasons. First,
local governments have exactly the same discretion over how to spend it as they
have over local tax revenues. This extends to federal monitoring and auditing
policies which target the use of earmarked transfers (these constitute the bulk of
non-FPM and tax municipal revenues) but not that of FPM transfers or local tax
revenue.17
Second, FPM revenues are allocated to municipalities on the basis of their pop-
ulation following a rule which creates quasi-exogenous variations in the amounts
of revenues municipalities receive. Municipalities are divided into population
brackets that determine the coefficients used to allocate total FPM resources a-
mong them, with higher population brackets corresponding to higher coefficients.
Formally, the rule specifies that the amount of FPM transfers received by munic-
ipality i in state s and year t is:
(1) FPMi,s,t =
FPMs,tλ(Pi,t−1)∑
i∈s λ(Pi,t−1)
where λ(.) is a step-wise function of estimated local population in the previous
year Pi,t−1, FPMs,t = γsFPMt is equal to the share of total resources FPMt
allocated to state s and λ(.) and γs are time-invariant. This rule applies to all
municipalities that are not state capitals and have less than 142,633 inhabitants.18
The Federal Audit Court sets each municipality’s coefficient based on the popu-
lation estimates calculated annually by the Brazilian statistical institute (IBGE).
Data on FPM transfers for the years 1998 to 2011 are obtained from the Brazil-
ian Treasury and I apply the FPM allocation rule (1) to the population estimates
to compute the amounts municipalities should receive if the rule was perfectly
implemented (predicted transfers). Figure 2 plots real (left panel) and predicted
(right panel) FPM revenue per capita averaged over 100 inhabitant cells against
municipal population estimates. Per capita transfers decrease with population
size except at the population cutoffs where they increase discontinuously. Jumps
in both real and predicted transfers are less visible from cutoff 7 onwards as dif-
ferences in shares received by each state and increases in total FPM revenues over
time introduce some noise. This will be partialled out in the regression analysis.19
17In particular the randomized audits used to construct the corruption variables do not directly consid-
er the use of tax revenue and FPM transfers. However some earmarked grants require that municipalities
contribute some of their ‘own’ revenues (defined legally as FPM transfer revenues or taxes) to the pro-
gram they fund; we can think of the audits as reflecting the overall quality of government spending.
Importantly, there is no reason to think that the use of tax revenue is more closely (indirectly) audited
than that of FPM transfers, or vice versa.
18Total FPM resources consist of 23.5% of revenues from the federal income tax and federal tax on
manufactured products. The γs are a function of state population and income per capita, with bigger
and poorer states receiving a larger share. The paper’s web appendix presents the population brackets,
the values of the FPM coefficients (λ(Pi,t−1)) and average real and predicted transfers in each bracket.
19The law creates 15 thresholds, but there are too few observations around the last cutoff to observe
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III. Conceptual framework
This section formalizes the hypotheses tested in the remainder of the paper.
Consider a politician who controls public revenues R coming from two sources:
taxes T and non-tax revenues F . In this context taxes are local municipal taxes
and non-tax revenues are transfers but this framework could also represent a
federal government receiving non-tax revenues from the exploitation of natural
resources or development aid. The politician can choose to spend revenues on
local public expenditure outcomes E which are either the provision of public
infrastructure that potentially increase the welfare of citizens (G) or rents that
only increase his own welfare (C). These are determined by the budget constraint
F +T = G+C , observable (Z) and unobservable (W ) characteristics of the local
government and potential participation to a tax capacity program (P = 1 is the
government participates). I write expenditure outcomes in government i as:
Ei = E(Ti(Zi,Wi, Pi), Fi(Zi,Wi), Zi,Wi), for all Ei = Gi, Ci(2)
The paper tests three hypothesis of interest.
Hypothesis 1: The tax capacity program increases tax revenues.
The first parameter of interest is the impact of the program on local tax revenues,
TPi , averaged over all municipalities that participate in the program. As explained
above the program improves governments’ capacity to enforce taxes and reduces
the cost of tax compliance. Hypothesis 1 states that TPi > 0, ie that politicians
will use these changes to increase tax revenues. The next two hypotheses of
interest relate to the relationship between revenues and expenditure outcomes.
Hypothesis 2: An increase in tax revenues leads to more provision of
public infrastructure.
Hypothesis 3: Governments spend revenues from taxes and transfers
differently.
The tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 consist in estimating the partial derivatives ETi
and EFi averaged over sub-samples of the population. Hypothesis 2 states that
GTi > 0, whilst hypothesis 3 assumes that marginal propensities to spend out of
taxes and transfers are different: ETi 6= EFi for E = G,C.
Several mechanisms could lead to a difference between how tax and non-tax
revenues are spent. First, increases in tax revenues affect the information citizens
have on public budgets differently from increases in transfer revenues. Political
agency models of public finance argue that politicians capture more rents and
provide less public goods when there are asymmetries of information over elements
of the public budget (see Besley and Smart (2007)). Increases in tax revenues
are by definition observed by the tax-paying part of the population, increases in
transfers from higher level of governments may not be observed as well. As shown
a clear jump in FPM revenues. I restrict estimation to the first 14 thresholds in what follows.
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in the theoretical (web) appendix this assumption would lead to increases in taxes
having a larger effect on the provision of public services and a smaller effect on
corruption than an increase in non-tax revenues of the same size.20
Second, increases in tax revenues could change citizens’ behavior. Citizens may
demand more from politicians when they pay more taxes - political scientists
have coined this the ‘no representation without taxation’ hypothesis (Ross, 2004,
Moore, 2007). Assuming that citizens’ utility is submodular in the public and
private goods or that individuals suffer from some version of the sunk cost fallacy
would formalize this argument: citizens paying more taxes to their local govern-
ment will also be more willing to exert effort to monitor the politician. Increases
in transfers do not impose a (direct) cost on them and hence does not affect their
interactions with the politician.21
Third, sorting of citizens with different tastes for public spending across local
governments, in the spirit of Tiebout (1956), could lead to the source of public
revenues affecting expenditure outcomes. In the Tiebout framework local spend-
ing must be funded by local taxes for population sorting to occur and gains from
decentralization to arise. An increase in taxes in a local government could attract
citizens that are both more willing to pay taxes and more likely to demand a cer-
tain type of public services or less tolerant of corruption. I assess the plausibility
of these mechanisms in the Brazilian context below. Note that these mechanisms
suggest that tax revenues will not only be spent differently, they will also be spent
‘better’ than transfer revenues - more on the provision of public infrastructure
and less on corruption: GT > GF and CT < CF .
IV. Empirical strategy
A. The tax experiment
I exploit the timing of the implementation of the tax capacity program to
identify its impact on tax revenues - parameter TP above- and the causal effect of
taxes on public expenditure outcomes - parameter ET above. We have seen that
take-up is not driven by observable shocks and that trends were not different in
PMAT and non-PMAT municipalities prior to 1998. This motivates the use of
a difference-in-differences specification as it seems a priori reasonable to assume
that unobservable characteristics that could confound identification are also fixed
over time. Formally, I test Hypotheses 1 and 2 above by estimating the following
20A related mechanism simply assumes that politicians are budget-maximizing and points out that
when the share of taxes in their total budget increases they have more incentives to invest in public
infrastructure if they expect these investments to increase their future tax base (Weingast, 2009).
21In the case considered here non-tax revenues are transfers from the federal government, funded by
federal taxes paid by citizens. The arguments developed above also imply that this type of ‘non-tax’
revenues will be spent differently from local tax revenues if we assume that increases in federal taxes paid
are only weakly correlated with increased in local transfers received, or that citizens do not understand
this link well. Both these assumptions are likely to hold in practice.
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model:
Ti,t = piTPMATi,t + δZi,t + γt + µi + i,t(3)
Ei,t = βTTi,t + ηZi,t + γt + µi + νi,t(4)
where PMATi,t is an indicator equal to 1 if municipality i started a program
in a year s ≤ t, Ti,t is tax revenues per capita and is instrumented by PMATi,t
in equation (4), Ei,t are expenditure outcomes of interest, Zi,t are time-varying
covariates, γt are year fixed effects and µi municipality fixed effects. Time-varying
controls Zi,t are proxies for the size of municipal tax bases (municipal GDP per
capita, shares of services and agriculture in GDP and population) and for prefer-
ences of the administration that could affect tax policy (mayor’s political party,
political competition during the last election, term limits). All specifications in
the paper allow for arbitrary covariance structure within municipalities.22
The key identifying assumption required for the interpretation of piT as the av-
erage effect of the program on taxes (TP ) and βT as the impact of tax revenues
on expenditure outcomes (ET ) is that the (conditional) evolution of tax collec-
tion and expenditure outcomes in PMAT and non-PMAT municipalities would
have been the same in the absence of the program. The fact, established in the
previous section, that time-varying covariates do not follow different trends in
PMAT municipalities prior to the start of the program is reassuring in that re-
spect. To further assess the plausibility of this assumption I look for differences
in the evolution of outcomes between PMAT and non-PMAT municipalities prior
to the start of the program by estimating a flexible reduced form specification of
the program’s impact on all outcomes of interest:
(5) Yi,t =
11∑
j=−11
piTjPMATj,i,t + θZi,t + γt + µi + νi,t.
Here Yi,t is tax revenues or expenditure outcomes, PMATj,i,t is equal to 1 if
municipality i in year t started a PMAT program j years ago (j ≥ 0), or will
start a program in j years (j < 0). Testing for pre-treatment trends is equivalent
to a test that the piTj are equal to zero for j < 0. This specification also allows
me to consider the time profile of the program’s impact.
Whilst reassuring, the absence of different trends prior to the start of the pro-
gram would not be sufficient to rule out self-selection into the program because of
time-varying shocks to unobservable characteristics Wi,t that also affect outcomes.
However, such shocks would affect outcomes as soon as municipalities self-select
in the program even if the program itself hasn’t started yet. I include an indicator
22Error correlation in the cross-section dimension of the panel could also be a concern if local govern-
ments’s tax policies respond to their neighbors’ policies. Clustering at the state-year level to allow for
such correlation however hardly affects the standard errors in all the specifications used below (results
available from the author upon request).
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equal to one if the municipality has applied to the program in specifications (3)
and (4) and all following specifications that include the program participation
variable to test for any potential ‘selection on unobservables’ effect. This test is
only valid if municipalities cannot manipulate the time they spend waiting be-
tween their application date and their start date, I provide some evidence in line
with this assumption below.
To interpret βT as the impact of higher taxes on municipal expenditure out-
comes (ET ) we must in addition assume that any impact of the program on out-
comes comes only from its effect on taxes (exclusion restriction). Municipalities
were explicitly not allowed to use program loans on education or health services,
any deviation from this rule was expected to be punished so it is a priori reason-
able to assume the loan does not have a direct impact on public infrastructure, I
discuss below how the magnitude and time profile of the effects rules out the pos-
sibility that the loan itself enabled municipalities to fund the observed increases.
We must also assume that the tax administration changes did not directly affect
how governments spend their revenues, I provide a test of this assumption when
discussing the interpretation of the findings.
A final concern arises if pre-treatment characteristics potentially correlated with
the dynamics of the outcome variable are unbalanced between PMAT and non-
PMAT municipalities (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998). Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics of municipalities prior to the start of the program by pro-
gram status. PMAT municipalities are richer, bigger and levy more taxes in 1998
than the average municipality, as expected from the analysis of determinants of
selection. They are also more likely to be the seat of a local branch of the judicia-
ry and a radio station, two characteristics known to affect municipal corruption
levels (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, Litschig and Zamboni, 2012). Covariate unbal-
ance is a concern here so I complement my empirical analysis by estimating a
propensity score-weighted version of equations (3) and (4) following Hirano and
Imbens (2001) (see also Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003)). This eliminates
potential bias due to covariate unbalance by 1) restricting the sample to obser-
vations in the common support of the covariate distribution and 2) obtaining
balance by re-weighting the control group observations by a function of their esti-
mated propensity to join the program.23 More details on the construction of the
weights and the common support sample are in the web appendix.
The common support sample consists of 3,724 municipalities (276 PMAT mu-
nicipalities and 3,448 non-PMAT). The last column of Table 2 shows that re-
stricting and weighting the sample of control municipalities leads to a reasonable
23This is done by estimating a model of the probability that a municipality joins the program as a
function of the set of pre-treatment covariates Z used in Table 1, obtaining the predicted probability
Pˆ (W ) and then estimating the specifications of interest with weights equal to unity for the treated
and Pˆ (W )/(1 − Pˆ (W )) for the controls.Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) show that this estimator
is efficient and Wooldridge (2007) that ignoring the first-stage estimation of the selection probabilities
when performing inference yields conservative standard errors. All results below present standard-errors
non-adjusted for first stage estimation, as bootstrapping procedures suggest there is little efficiency lost
in doing so.
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balance in pre-treatment characteristics. The balance across groups improves,
including for covariates that are not used to estimate the propensity score: total
public revenues, municipal health and education infrastructure, life expectancy,
education level, local judiciary or radio presence and measures of corruption.
B. The transfer experiment
I use the FPM allocation rule to estimate the causal effect of non-tax revenues
on public expenditure outcomes (parameter EF above). The variations created
by the rule are typical of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design: the probability
of treatment (higher FPM revenues) increases discontinuously when the running
variable (municipal population) reaches the cutoffs but there are cases of mis-
assignment around the cutoffs. I consequently use an indicator equal to one if
population is above a cutoff as an instrument for non-tax revenues per capita
whilst flexibly controlling for municipal population size on both sides of the cut-
offs.
Several articles have used this research design before: Litschig and Morrison
(2013) compares municipalities that were just below or just above the cutoffs
in 1982, Brollo et al. (2013) and Corbi, Papaioannou and Surico (2014) exploit
cross-municipalities differences in FPM transfers in the 2000-2010 period. My
estimation strategy differs from that used in those papers as I mostly consid-
er within-municipality variations: I identify the impact of FPM transfers from
municipalities that cross a cutoff over time.24 Getting rid of variations across
municipalities facilitates the comparison with the impact of tax revenues generat-
ed by the program for two reasons. First, comparing municipalities on both sides
of the thresholds would use variations in transfer revenues which potentially exist
since 1981 (the year in which the cutoffs where last updated). This cumulated
difference in transfer revenues created by the cutoffs between municipalities could
be considerably larger than the increase in tax revenues created by the program,
but the increase in revenues within municipalities when they reach a cutoff is
on average similar to that generated by the program (see below). Second, over
the period municipalities experience increases in transfer revenues for roughly the
same amount of time as PMAT municipalities are observed in the program (7
years): municipalities that change population bracket in the sample remain in
that bracket but close to the cutoff 5 years on average.25 I report results obtained
using variations both across and within municipalities as a robustness check.
This research design identifies EF if municipal characteristics determining out-
comes vary smoothly as a function of population. As shown in Lee and Lemieux
(2010) the assumption that the density of the treatment-determining variable
is continuous is sufficient for continuity of observable and unobservable charac-
24The web appendix lists the number of times a municipality is observed crossing each threshold: there
are at least 2500 observations each for the first 5 thresholds, 850 for the next 5 and 350 for the last 4.
25Here I define ‘close to the cutoff’ as above the cutoff but below the midpoint between that cutoff
and the cutoff above it - see specifications 6 and 7 below.
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teristics. This assumption allows municipalities to have some control over their
population size as long as this control is imprecise so that we can think of treat-
ment status as randomized close to the cutoff. Municipal population estimates
are constructed annually by the IBGE in a top down fashion unaffected by the
political process: in each year experts impute a rate of population growth to each
state and then each municipality based on their relative growth rates between the
last two available census. These estimates are then used by Brazil’s high court
to determine FPM transfers and the high court publishes its own estimates of
municipal population in most years. Several papers find evidence that the high
court’s estimates do not always match the IBGE’s and that the density of the high
courts’ estimates is abnormally high just above some cutoffs (Monasterio, 2013,
Litschig, 2012). None of these papers find that the IBGE population estimates
themselves are manipulated, I only use these estimates in what follows.
I provide more details on the construction of the population estimates and
several checks on the continuity of municipal population around the cutoffs in
the web appendix. I implement the formal check for continuous density at the
cutoffs suggested by McCrary (2008) both on the pooled sample and for each
cutoff separately. I also run two additional validity checks motivated by the use
of within-municipality variations for identification which is new to this paper. I
first consider whether the probability of crossing a FPM cutoff is different from
the probability of crossing any other population cutoff by plotting population
growth rates between years t and t − 1 as a function of distance to the cutoff
at time t − 1. I also check for the balance of pre-treatment characteristics by
considering whether municipalities that will cross a threshold at time t+ 1 differ
systematically at time t from those that won’t along any observable characteristic.
None of these test suggest a violation of the identifying assumption.26
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) my main estimation approach is to use
local linear regressions in samples around each cutoff using a rectangular kernel. I
complement this by using all municipalities and controlling flexibly for population
using spline polynomials.27All specifications exclude observations with a (lagged)
population of more than 142,633 inhabitants as these are not affected by the
allocation rule, or below 6,792, as these are below the ‘mid-point’ between 0 and
the first cutoff, following Litschig and Morrison (2013) and Brollo et al. (2013). I
first allow the impact of the discontinuities on FPM revenues piF and that of FPM
revenues on expenditure outcomes βF to differ at each cutoff c by estimating the
26The existence of other government policies discontinuous in municipal population size could also
bias the estimates. There is one such policy: the wage of local councillors is capped and increases dis-
continuously when population reaches 10,000, 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. Transfers do not increase
at these thresholds but FPM cutoffs 1,8, and 13 are nearby (at 10,188, 50,940 and 101,880). This is
a potential cause for concern as Ferraz and Finan (2011b) show that these higher wages attract more
educated and productive politicians who could choose to allocate budgets differently. I consider results
excluding cutoffs 1,8 and 13 as a robustness check in the web appendix.
27This allows for a non-linear effect of population on outcomes which differs on both sides of the cutoffs
and is particularly important because FPM revenues per capita are declining in population size on both
sides of the cutoffs (Figure 2). I choose the order of the polynomial such that it best matches the local
linear estimates.
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following equations:
Fi,t =
14∑
c=1
[piFcDi,t + fc(Pi,t−1) + gc(Pi,t−1)(Pi,t−1 − cutoffc)]1c + pizZi,t + γt + µi + i,t
(6)
Ei,t =
14∑
c=1
[βFcFi,t + fc(Pi,t−1) + gc(Pi,t−1)(Pi,t−1 − cutoffc)]1c + βzZi,t + γt + µi + i,t
(7)
where Di,t = 1[Pi,t−1 > cutoffc] and c = 1, 2.., 14
and (when the specification is a local linear regression):
1c =1[cutoffc(1− p) < Pi,t−1 < cutoffc(1 + p)], p = 2, 5%, fc(Pi,t) = acPi,t−1 and gc(Pi,t) = bcPi,t−1
or (when the specification is a polynomial):
1c =1[midpointc,c−1 < Pi,t−1 < midpointc,c+1], fc(Pi,t) = acPi,t−1 + acP
2
i,t−1 + ...+ acP
n
i,t,
gc(Pi,t) = bcPi,t−1 + bcP 2i,t−1 + ...+ bcP
n
i,t
where Pi,t is estimated population size in municipality i and year t, Fi,t is
FPM revenues per capita and is instrumented by Di,t in equation (7), Ei,t are
expenditure outcomes of interest, the indicators 1c divide the sample in segments
around the cutoffs, and midpointc,c+1 is equal to the midpoint in between two
population cutoffs. I include year fixed effects and covariates Zi,t to control for
variations in total FPM resources over time and chance correlation with treatment
status.
To facilitate the comparison with the impact of tax revenues I also consider a
summary measure of the impact of FPM revenues on expenditure outcomes by
pooling observations from all cutoffs. I create a new population variable P˜ equal
to estimated lagged population scaled by the value of the nearest cutoff:
P˜i,t =
14∑
c=1
[Pi,t−1 − cutoffc]1c
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and estimate
Fi,t = piFDi,t +
14∑
c=1
[fc(P˜i,t) + gc(P˜i,t)(P˜i,t > 0)]1c +
14∑
c=1
1c + pizZi,t + γt + µi + νi,t
(8)
Ei,t = βFcFi,t +
14∑
c=1
[fc(P˜i,t) + gc(P˜i,t)(P˜i,t > 0)]1c +
14∑
c=1
1c + βzZi,t + γt + µi + i,t
(9)
where all variables are as above.
Estimation on the pooled sample allows for 28 different slopes (or 28 different
polynomials in P when the full sample is used), one each on either side of the 14
cutoffs, but imposes common effects βF and piF .
C. Comparing tax and transfer revenues
I jointly estimate the impact of tax and non-tax revenues by considering the
following equation:
(10)
Ei,t = βTTi,t+βFFi,t+
14∑
c=1
[fc(P˜i,t)+gc(P˜i,t)(P˜i,t > 0)]1c+
14∑
c=1
1c+δZi,t+γt+µi+i,t
where outcomes Ei,t are expenditure outcomes of interest, program participation
PMATi,t and the indicator Di,t are used as instruments for Ti,t and Fi,t, all other
variables are as above and Zi,t includes an indicator of whether the municipality
has applied to the tax capacity program. I flexibly control for population size
using spline polynomials or local linear regressions as above.
I have discussed above the assumptions needed for the interpretation of βT and
βF as estimates of the causal impacts of tax or non-tax revenues on outcomes
(ET and EF ). To interpret the comparison of the two estimates as a test of
Hypothesis 3 (ET i 6= EFi, ∀i) an additional assumption on the heterogeneity of
these parameters is needed. The specification in equation (10) identifies two
local average treatment effects (Imbens and Angrist, 1994): βF identifies the
average EF among municipalities close to a cutoff and βT the average ET among
those whose tax revenues increase thanks to the program. Heterogeneity of the
parameters across the populations affected by each instrument could therefore
lead to estimates that are different even if any given municipality spends tax
and transfer revenues in the same way.28 The average PMAT municipality is
28In other words, the difference between βT and βF in (10) is a test of the equality of ET and EF if
these parameters is homogenous in the population.
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larger and richer than the average municipality affected by the FPM transfer
allocation rule and may for example have stronger public capacity to improve
local infrastructure, or conversely less of a need for more public infrastructure, so
the bias cannot be signed.
The particular design used to identify EF allows us to partially test this as-
sumption because it provides us with 14 local estimates of EF . This helps in two
ways. First, considering the distribution of these 14 different estimates of EF is
one way to assess the extent to which the parameter varies in the population and
provides bounds that can be compared to the estimate of ET . Second, some of
the sub-populations around the cutoffs are a priori more comparable to PMAT
municipalities because they have similar characteristics.
I therefore estimate equation (10) on different samples to estimate the impact
of tax and transfer revenues on outcomes among municipalities that are as com-
parable as possible. I consider a sample of municipalities that are ‘close enough’
to the cutoffs (5% bandwidth); this specification implies that the impact of tax
revenues is estimated using only PMAT municipalities that are also affected by
the instrument for transfers. I then restrict estimation to the weighted common
support sample: in this specification non-PMAT municipalities are weighted by
a function of their estimated propensity score so the impact of transfers is esti-
mated for an average municipality which is by construction very similar to that
on which the impact of tax revenues is estimated.
Finally, I estimate equation (10) on a sample consisting only of municipalities
that join the program and are affected by the transfer allocation rule, using the
number of years a municipality has been participating in the program as an in-
strument for tax revenues. This allows me to estimate EF and ET on the same
sub-sample of municipalities and test whether heterogeneity in the way all rev-
enues are spent is driving a potential difference between the estimates, at the cost
of substantially reducing the sample size.
V. Main results
In this section I first present evidence regarding the impact of the tax capacity
program on tax revenues (Hypothesis 1) and on the effect of tax revenues on
municipal education infrastructure (Hypothesis 2). I then turn to the impact of
the transfer allocation rule on both transfer revenues and education infrastructure.
A. The tax experiment
Hypothesis 1: Impact of the program on tax revenues. — Figure 3 present
graphical evidence on the impact of the program on tax revenues. The graphs
plot the estimated piTj from equation (5): each point on the solid lines summa-
rizes the effect of having been in the program for j years (for j > 0) or of starting
the program in j years (for j < 0) compared to the year just before the program
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started.29 The top graph considers the impact of the program on all PMAT mu-
nicipalities, the bottom graph only on the 57 PMAT municipalities that waited
two years after applying before they received their first loan (other PMAT munic-
ipalities are dropped). There is no evidence that municipalities that eventually
join the program experience different trends prior to its start: the estimated pij
are very close to 0 for j < 0. This is also true for municipalities that wait 2 years
between their application date and their start date; we see no change in outcomes
at the date at which they self-select (j = −2).
Table 3 reports estimates of the impact of the tax capacity program on tax
revenues (equation (3)) in panel A. In columns 1 and 2 the model is estimated
on the whole sample and with and without covariates, in column 3 the sample
is restricted to the common support sample and non-PMAT observations are
weighted by a function of their propensity score. The impact of the program is
slightly smaller when we include controls and re-weight observations, suggesting
that unbalanced treatment characteristics introduce a small bias. Tax revenues
increase by 10-11 Rs per capita thanks to the tax capacity program on average,
ie after seven years in the program. This is a 10% increase with respect to the
baseline level. As municipalities receive 9.6 Rs per capita in loans through the
program on average this implies that each Real invested in tax administration
roughly yields an extra 1 Real in tax collection each year.
The last two columns present robustness checks for the main estimates by con-
sidering alternative specifications. In column 4 I replace municipality with mu-
nicipal administration fixed effects. More educated mayors are more likely to join
the program, this could bias results if they are also better at collecting taxes but
the estimate is unaffected. The estimates in column 5 are obtained on a sample
consisting only of the 339 municipalities that join the program and replacing the
indicator for program participation with a variable equal to the number of years
since the municipality started a program. This allows me to use only munici-
palities which will join the program in later years as a control group at the cost
of imposing a linear impact of the program over time. If the findings above are
due to different trends in PMAT and non-PMAT municipalities we should see no
impact of the program in this sample. The estimated impact of having been an
extra year in the program, at 3.2 extra tax revenues per capita, is in line with the
average impact of the program in the previous columns.
The estimated impact of having applied to the program but not received the
loan yet is always close to zero and imprecisely estimated, in line with the graphi-
cal evidence above. This can only be interpreted as evidence that there is no effect
on outcomes of simply selecting into the program if we think that municipalities
cannot control the amount of time they wait between applying and starting the
program. In particular, if municipalities that are less motivated to increase tax-
29I only plot estimates from 5 years before to 5 years after the start of the program, because the
majority of PMAT municipalities are observed for that period, but the regressions include the full set of
dummies, as specified in equation (5). Results are unaffected when I exclude municipalities that are not
observed 5 years before and after the start of the program.
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es wait longer the lack of effect of having applied to the program could simply
reflect differences between municipalities that wait and those that do not. Evi-
dence presented in the web appendix suggests this is not the case, as the impact
of the program on outcomes does not vary in a systematic way with the amount
of time a municipality waited after applying to the program. Overall, this evi-
dence confirms that unobserved time-varying shocks are not driving the results,
and in particular that an increase in motivation of the local administration is
not a sufficient condition for the observed change in outcomes. It may however
be a necessary condition: imposing the program on municipalities in which local
officials are not interested in increasing tax collection is unlikely to yield similar
outcomes. We should therefore interpret the 10% increase in tax collection as the
program’s average treatment effect on the treated: the impact of the program on
tax revenues amongst municipalities that join.30
Hypothesis 2: Impact of tax revenues on education infrastructure. —
Figures 4 and 5 present graphical evidence on the evolution of local education
infrastructure before and after the start of the program. We see an increase in
education infrastructure after the program starts, in line with the increase in tax
revenues observed in Figure 3. Panel B of Table 3 shows the impact of a 10
Rs increase in tax revenues thanks to the program on the quantity and quali-
ty of municipal education infrastructure (equation (4)). Tax revenues increase
the quantity of classrooms in use in municipal schools by 0.32-0.45 per thousand
school-age inhabitants, a 4-5% increase relative to the baseline level. The index
of quality of municipal school infrastructure increases by 0.115-0.14, roughly one-
tenth of a standard deviation.31 The estimates are stable across specifications
and samples and we see no impact of having applied to the program on education
infrastructure in the regression estimates or the graphical evidence. I also con-
sider the impact of tax revenues on the number of school employees in municipal
schools. Results show that the extra revenues generated by the program were
not used to hire more school employees, as expected given that this particular
expenditure is funded through specific grants (see web appendix). Finally, the
web appendix provides some results regarding the reduced-form impact of the
program on literacy rates of cohorts that could have attended municipal schools
over the period of study, using information from the 2000 and 2010 census. We
see a small impact (1 percentage point) on the literacy rates of children aged 5
to 9 but it is not robust to changes in the specification used.
30I only weight non PMAT municipalities by a function of their propensity score in the weighted
difference-in-differences specification, in line with the method developed by Hirano and Imbens (2001)
to estimate average treatment effect on the treated. I could obtain an estimate of the average treatment
effect on the whole population by also weighting PMAT municipalities, but this is not appropriate in
this context.
31The web appendix presents the impact of the program on each indicator of school quality separately.
The aggregate impact is driven by changes in the number of schools with computers, TV, a science lab
and an internet connection.
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A back of the envelope calculation suggests the magnitudes in Table 3 are
plausible. PMAT municipalities spend on average 28% of their 450 Rs per capita
in revenues on education and have 9.2 classrooms per 1000 school-age inhabitants
on average. Assuming the average propensity to spend on all types of education
infrastructure is the same this means they open a new classroom for each extra
13.7 Rs per capita in revenues (13.7 = 0.28 ∗ 450/9.2). The tax capacity program
increases annual tax revenue by roughly 10 Rs, this would lead to an extra 0.73
classrooms if all the increase was spent on education, and an extra 0.22 classrooms
if 28% of it was spent on education. The estimated increase in classrooms is within
this range. In contrast the amount lent by the program - a one-time transfer of
9.6 Rs on average - could only have funded this extra education infrastructure for
one year. Figures 4 and 5 indicate an increase in education infrastructure which
lasts at least 5 years and hence could not have been financed by the loan.
B. The transfer experiment
Figure 6 plots the residuals from a regression of transfer revenues per capita on
municipality and year fixed effects and a set of 14 segment dummies against the
scaled population variable P˜i,t. There is a clear jump at the population cutoffs
of roughly 13 Rs that dwarfs any variation away from the cutoffs. Figures 7 and
8 plot the residuals from a regression of the number of classrooms in municipal
schools (Figure 7) or the index of municipal school quality (Figure 8) on mu-
nicipality, year and segment fixed effects against scaled population. There is no
evidence of a jump when population size reaches a threshold for either of these
outcomes. Table 4 presents regression estimates. Columns 1 through 4 control
for population size using local linear regressions around each cutoff, restricting
the sample to a 2% bandwidth around the cutoffs in columns 1 and 2, and to a
5% bandwidth in columns 3 and 4, column 5 uses the entire sample of municipal-
ities affected by the transfer allocation rule and controls for a spline third-order
polynomial in population size. Columns 1 and 3 present results obtained from
a specification without covariates and municipality fixed effects, thereby using
variations both within and across municipalities for identification.
In the first panel, I show the impact of the population discontinuities on FPM
transfer revenues per capita (equation (8)). We see that transfer revenues increase
sharply by 12-14 Rs per capita at the population cutoffs on average. Estimates of
equation (9) in the second panel show that the impacts of transfer revenues on the
quantity and quality of education infrastructure are on average zero - they are very
small, not statistically significant, and change sign across specifications. Including
covariates, using both variations both within and accross municipalities, or using
different methods to control for population size does not affect the results.32
32Results in the web appendix further show that the lack of impact of transfer revenues on outcomes
is robust to excluding the three cutoffs which are near population thresholds at which the wages of local
councillors increase.
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I investigate whether the null effects in Table 4 are in fact averages over positive
and negative (or noisy) effects in the web appendix by considering graphical and
regression evidence for each cutoff separately. The first two brackets experience
an increase of more than 20 Rs per capita, around the last four the increase is less
than 5 Rs. The estimated impact of transfers on education infrastructure quantity
is statistically significant at the 10% level in 5 cases out of 70 estimates (2 positive,
3 negative), and that on education infrastructure quality in 1 case (positive) out of
70 estimates. This is roughly what we would expect if all parameters were zero. At
no threshold are these positive effects robust across specifications. These findings
indicate that increases in FPM transfers are not used to fund improvements in
these two measures of municipal education infrastructure. There is no impact, as
expected, of FPM transfers on the number of employees in municipal schools -
see the web appendix.
Comparison with the literature. — We have found above that municipal edu-
cation infrastructure quantity and quality do not increase with transfer revenues.
This contrasts with results in Litschig and Morrison (2013): they find that trans-
fers increase schooling per capita and literacy rates amongst local governments in
Brazil in the 1980s. In the web appendix I replicate their analysis of the impact
of transfers in the early 1980s on 1990 Census outcomes by looking at the impact
of transfers in the early 2000s on 2010 Census outcomes. I find no impact of
transfers on education outcomes. The difference between the results presented
here and their study cannot therefore be due to the use of different outcomes,
empirical strategy, or time lag between the increase in transfers and the measure
of outcomes; it is more likely explained by three key differences between their
setting (the 1980s and early 1990s) and the 1998-2011 period studied here.
First, their object of study is small municipalities (those around the first 3
population thresholds) in the 1980s, a period during which Brazilian local gov-
ernments had a lot less revenues than in the 2000s, and hardly any tax revenues.33
Increases in FPM revenues played a larger role in relaxing government’s budget
constraints back in the 1980: they represented nearly half of total revenues in
1980 compared to a third in my period of study. Second, their main outcome of
interest - literacy in adults aged 19 to 28- is much higher in the 2010 census (close
to 90%) than in the 1990 census they consider (78%), leaving less room for im-
provement. Third, and most importantly, they study an extremely large increase
in transfer revenues of a magnitude never observed since 1985. They consider
cumulated transfers in the 1982-1985 period which were determined by munic-
ipal population measured in the 1980 census. From 1985 onwards population
estimates were revised annually, leading to a much smaller effect on cumulated
future transfer revenues of being above a population cutoff in any given year (see
web appendix). The increase in FPM revenues they study thus represents 2.5%
33In particular, the large grants earmarked for education that municipalities currently receive were all
created after the mid-1990s.
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of local GDP in rural areas (1.4% in urban areas) compared to less than 0.3% of
GDP in the 1998-2011 period.
VI. Comparing tax and non-tax revenues
This section first presents some evidence that attempts to test whether munic-
ipalities spend increases in tax and transfer revenues differently (Hypothesis 3).
The results discussed above indicate that increases in tax revenues lead to higher
municipal education infrastructure (GT > 0) whereas increases in transfer rev-
enues do not (GF = 0). To test whether revenues from different sources are spent
differently we must consider whether the difference between our estimates of GT
and GF could be due to the fact that they are obtained on groups of municipal-
ities with different characteristics that lead them to spend increases in all types
of revenues differently. I present several results suggesting that heterogeneity in
GT and GF is unlikely to be driving the observed difference, though I cannot
completely rule out this explanation for the entire sample of municipalities. I
then discuss possible mechanisms for the observed difference and show evidence
that allows me to rule out some of them.
A. Results
Table 5 presents results from the estimation of equation (10) on different sam-
ples to attempt to estimate the impact of tax and transfer revenues on outcomes
among comparable municipalities, as discussed above. Results in the first column
are obtained on the whole sample with municipality fixed effects, results in col-
umn 2 include municipal administration fixed effects. Results in columns 3 and 4
consider smaller samples: in column 3 the estimation uses only municipalities in
a 5% bandwith around the FPM cutoffs; in column 4 the sample is the weighted
common support sample.34
The impact of non-tax revenues on municipal education infrastructure in Panels
A and B is never statistically significant regardless of the specification used and it
is always much smaller than the impact of tax revenues. The estimates of βT are
very similar when estimated on smaller samples in columns 3 and 4 though not
always statistically significant. A formal test of βF = βT is given in the last line
of both panels. The null hypothesis is rejected when the whole sample is used;
it cannot always be rejected among smaller samples but this is because standard
errors increase – point estimates are similar.
The stability of results across samples suggests there is little underlying varia-
tion in the impact of transfer revenues on outcomes. The web appendix presents
further evidence that this impact is unlikely to differ significantly in the pop-
ulation by presenting estimates of GF around each cutoff separately and, for
34The first stages for tax and transfer revenues on these different samples are presented in the web
appendix.
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each segment of the population around a FPM cutoff, descriptive characteristics
of variables which could affect the impact of public revenues on outcomes and
the average weight of non-PMAT municipalities used in the common support
regression. Municipalities around cutoffs 9 to 12 are very similar to PMAT mu-
nicipalities, including along characteristics that are likely correlated with demand
for education (similar baseline GDP, public revenues and health and education
infrastructure in particular) and are given more weight in the propensity-score
weighted specification. It is reassuring to see that the impact of transfer revenues
on municipal education infrastructure is not different around cutoffs 9 to 12.
Finally, Table 6, Panel A presents estimates of the impact of tax and non-tax
revenues on outcomes amongst only municipalities that join the program at some
point and are affected by the transfer allocation rule.35 This allows me to test
whether tax and non-tax revenues are spent differently by the same municipalities,
albeit on a smaller sample. The population cutoffs increase non-tax revenues by
a precisely estimated 10 Rs even in this smaller sample. We see no impact of
this increase in non-tax revenues on education infrastructure outcomes. Overall,
whilst I cannot test the assumption that GF is homogenous in the population,
the evidence suggests that i) variations in municipalities’ marginal propensity to
spent out of all types of revenues are likely too small to explain the observed
difference between the estimates of ET and EF , and ii) a small sub-sample of
municipalities amongst which both impacts can be estimated do spend tax and
non-tax revenues differently.
The results above show that one type of local public infrastructure increases
with tax revenues and not with non-tax revenues. This is in line with the hypoth-
esis that tax and non-tax revenues are spent differently but does not necessarily
indicate that tax revenues are spent ‘better’. Municipalities could be spending
non-tax revenues on other types of expenditures that also potentially increase
welfare and local human capital. An interesting candidate is health, which is
the second largest municipal budget item and for which some data is available
but only for four years. I consider whether transfer revenues are spent more to-
wards local health infrastructure than tax revenues by estimating equation (10)
using the number of municipal health establishments per 100,000 inhabitants as
outcome variable. Results are presented in paper’s online Appendix. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that both tax and non-tax revenues have no impact on the
number of municipal health units but can reject that non-tax revenues have a
bigger impact than taxes, though results are fairly sensitive to the specification
used.
Some evidence on what FPM transfers are used for is found in Brollo et al.
(2013) who, in the same period and using a similar identification strategy, find
that they lead to more corruption amongst municipalities close to the first four
35This excludes state capitals and municipalities whose population exceeds 142,633 or is lower than
6,792 at some point over the period, ie 25% of municipalities that join the program.
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population cutoffs.36 I cannot directly compare the impact of tax and non-tax
revenues on corruption as corruption data is available for extremely few munic-
ipalities close to cutoffs 9 to 12 and these are the municipalities which are the
most relevant for the comparison. Instead I look for evidence suggestive of an im-
pact of tax revenues on corruption by comparing non PMAT municipalities with
PMAT municipalities that were audited either before they start the program or
after they start the program. I estimate a modified version of equation (4) where
municipality fixed effects are replaced by a dummy Ji equal to 1 if municipality
i joins the tax capacity program at some point in the period and a set X of
time-invariant municipal characteristics measured in the 2000 Census37:
(11) Ci,t = βTTi,t + δ1Zi,t + δ2Xi + ηJi + γt + i,t
Results are presented in the paper’s web appendix. I consider as proxies for
corruption Ci,tthe three measures compiled by Litschig and Zamboni (2012) and
the two measures compiled by Brollo et al. (2013) from the randomized audits
of municipalities. I find that PMAT municipalities audited prior to the start of
the program were roughly as corrupt as non-PMAT municipalities and that the
increase in tax revenues thanks to the program does not lead to any increase
in the number of irregularities reported in the audits. This suggests that an
increase in tax revenue does not increase corruption in a context where increases
in transfer revenues do, at least among the smaller municipalities considered by
Brollo et al. (2013). Interestingly one of the mechanisms that leads to transfer
revenues increasing corruption in Brollo et al. (2013) cannot explain the observed
difference between tax and non-tax revenues in this paper. They argue that higher
revenues give politicians more room to grab rents without disappointing voters
and that this in turn leads to worse quality (because rent-seeking) politicians
being elected when transfer revenues are high. Evidence in column 3 in Table 5
shows that results hold using only variations within a municipal administration
- holding the quality of politicians constant - so the idea that different types of
revenues attract different types of politicians cannot explain the results.
There is no data available on other potential uses of municipal revenues, but
fiscal data allows me to consider non-spending consequences of increases in rev-
enues. Municipalities could choose to use extra revenues to decrease their indebt-
edness, decrease taxes (when transfers increase) or as leverage to obtain more
discretionary federal transfers which sometimes require that municipalities com-
mit some of their own revenues (defined as local taxes or FPM transfers) to a
36See Brollo et al. (2013), Figure 2 and Table 3: the broad measure of corruption increases by 0.11 on
average at the cutoffs from a baseline of 0.79 and the narrow measure by 0.15 from a baseline of 0.46.
This translates into 14% and 33% increase on average at the four first cutoffs where transfer revenues
per capita increase by 18.5 Rs.
37These are urban population, inequality, life expectancy, median education level, whether the munic-
ipality has a local radio station and whether it is the seat of a local branch of the judiciary. All other
variables are as above, program participation is used as an instrument for tax revenues.
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particular type of expenditure. The last panel of Table 5 considers the effect of
tax or transfer revenues on municipal public spending per capita. We see that
an extra 10 Rs in tax or transfer revenues leads to an increase in public spending
that is very close to 10 Rs. This suggest there is no, or very little, crowding out
(or in) of other types of revenues and that increases in revenues are not used
to decrease municipal debt.38 Overall the findings are consistent with the idea
that tax revenue are spent ‘better’ than transfers: tax revenues have a bigger
impact on municipal infrastructure that potentially benefit citizens and possibly
a smaller impact on corruption than non-tax revenues.
B. Mechanisms
Different mechanisms could explain the difference between how tax and non-
tax revenues are spent, as explained above. I first show that it is unlikely that
different characteristics of the revenues not necessarily related to their source lead
to them being differently spent. I then discuss mechanisms that may explain the
results. All results discussed in this sub-section can be found in the paper’s web
appendix unless indicated otherwise.
Characteristics of the revenues unrelated to their source. — The average
increase in non-tax revenues generated by the population cutoffs is of roughly the
same size as the average increase in taxes thanks to the tax capacity program (10
Rs) so scale effects cannot explain the results. Asymmetries between the impact
of increases and decreases of revenues on expenditure outcomes could explain
part of the results: the estimated impact of non-tax revenues is averaged over
increases and decreases in FPM revenues but the estimate of the impact of taxes
comes from only increases in tax revenues. This would lead to βF being smaller
than βT even if the structural impact of increases in both types of revenues is the
same if, for example, municipalities find it difficult to shut down classrooms when
revenues fall. Excluding from the sample municipalities which drop to a lower
population bracket at least once during the period (15% of municipalities) does
not however affect the results.
Differences in the predictability of tax and transfer revenue could potentially
explain the results. Politicians may be less willing to spend increases in non-tax
revenues on items that require committing funds over time if they cannot predict
how long they will last. This is unlikely to explain the results because in this
context transfer revenues are not more volatile than taxes. On the contrary the
within-municipality standard deviation is smaller relative to the mean for FPM
revenues than for tax revenues, even after the tax capacity program. This is be-
cause FPM transfers only vary with population and the total amount allocated to
38This is in line with results in Corbi, Papaioannou and Surico (2014). Reliable data on municipal
debt is not available for this period of study, total spending is defined in fiscal data as excluding debt
payments.
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FPM at the federal level whereas tax revenues react to changes in local economic
conditions.39 This being said, politicians are in direct control of tax revenues and
have no control over municipal population estimates that determine transfers, so
I cannot rule out that they think of tax revenues as a more reliable source of
public funds than transfers.40
Finally, the tax capacity program itself could have made local governments
spend all types of public revenues better, threatening the validity of program
participation as an instrument for tax revenues. The re-organization of municipal
tax departments may for example have had positive externalities on other de-
partments through transfers of staff or sharing of information and best practices.
The existence of exogenous variations in non-tax revenues allows for a test of this
particular violation of the exclusion restriction: we can check whether PMAT
municipalities spend FPM revenues better after the start of the program. The
low number of observations means results must be treated with caution but the
last panel of Table 6 shows the assumption seems to hold: there is no impact of
increases in non-tax revenues amongst PMAT municipalities after the start of the
program. This suggests the program itself did not directly affect how governments
spend public revenues.41
Taxes vs non-tax revenues. — As explained above we expect tax revenues to
lead to more infrastructure spending than non-tax revenues if citizens are bet-
ter informed about increases in taxes. Increases in tax revenues are necessarily
observed by those that pay them but citizens may have to exert effort to know
about increases in transfers: to compute the amount of transfers received by the
government in a given year citizens would have to obtain information not only
on the rule but on the total amount of revenues reserved for FPM transfers at
the federal level and the precise population estimates used. If this hypothesis
is correct we expect to see a smaller difference between how taxes and transfers
are spent when citizens have more access to information on the public budget.
Following Ferraz and Finan (2011a) I use the presence of a local radio station
39Other types of non-tax revenues are probably more volatile so this mechanism may play a role in
other contexts. The high volatility of aid revenues has for example been invoked to explain why aid is
not necessarily spent on infrastructure investments (Bulir and Hamann, 2008).
40The Brazilian federation context could also explain part of the results. There is one institutional
difference in the way FPM revenues and local tax revenues are monitored: state governments have the
power to monitor the use of FPM revenues but not that of municipal tax revenues. Conversations in the
field suggest this power is in practice hardly ever used, but municipalities could exert more caution in
spending FPM resources if they fear state monitoring. It may be that spending on education infrastruc-
ture whilst abiding by state procurement rules takes more time, or is more difficult in particularly strict
states. I find however no evidence that FPM revenues have an effect on outcomes with a one or two
years lag or that there is an effect in some states but not others. This suggests state oversight cannot
explain why FPM revenues have no impact on education infrastructure.
41Another possible channel through which the program could have affected outcomes directly is
through citizen’s political response to improved tax enforcement, as seen in Casaburi and Troiano (2015)
who show that Italian citizens are more likely to re-elect mayors that implemented an anti tax-evasion
program. I do not however find any impact of the PMAT program on the probability that the incumbent
is re-elected - results are available in the online appendix.
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as a proxy for how much local information citizens can access and estimate e-
quation (10) adding interaction terms between tax and transfer revenues and a
time-invariant indicator for presence of a local radio station in the municipality
in 1998. Results show that tax revenues have a significantly bigger impact on
municipal education infrastructure than transfer revenues when there is no local
radio station, but the difference is no longer statistically significant when the mu-
nicipality has its own radio station (see web appendix). This is not a rigorous
test of this mechanism as the presence of a local radio station is likely correlated
with municipal characteristics that affect how revenues are spent. Nevertheless
the evidence does not contradict the idea that information asymmetries explain
part of the observed difference.
Two theories suggest that demand for public services or citizen’s willingness to
constrain politicians to meet this demand increases when tax revenue increase.
Tiebout-style explanations suggest that an increase in taxes will attract different
types of citizens, but mobility costs in Brazil are likely too high for this mechanism
to bite (Timmins and Menezes, 2005). The literature in political science argues
that paying more taxes (or starting to pay taxes) makes citizens demand more
from their government and/or spend more time monitoring elected politicians;
this idea came up often during interviews with taxpayers and politicians (see for
example Paler (2013)). In the absence of data on migration across municipalities
over the period, citizens’ preferences or endeavors to control their politicians
these two mechanisms cannot be formally tested.42 There is however evidence
from the US that extra spending on school infrastructure has a large impact on
housing prices, indicating that local residents value such increases highly (Cellini,
Ferreira and Rothstein, 2010). This suggests that increases in physical education
infrastructure could be a particular visible use of public funds and hence the one
politicians may choose to spend extra tax revenues on if indeed citizens demand
more from their politicians when they pay more taxes.
Finally it is likely that the way in which tax revenues were increased explain-
s how they were subsequently spent. Increases in tax revenues can come from
higher tax rates or higher tax bases. Municipal data on tax rates is not available
but evidence on actions financed by the program from a qualitative study of early
participants (BNDES, 2002) and interviews with local officials (see web appendix)
suggests that the main impact of the program was to widen the municipal tax
base.43 The program likely increased the number of individuals and firms paying
local taxes and changed the characteristic of the median taxpayer, and may have
forced governments to become more responsive to the demands of that median
42A proxy for citizens’ willingness to monitor and hold accountable elected politicians could be voter
turnout. Voting is compulsory in Brazil however, and the (small) variations in turnout at municipal
elections are probably due to differences in enforcement of compulsory voting regulations.
43Several municipalities report decreasing their tax rates thanks to the PMAT program. In the city of
Nova Iguacu for example both the number of registered properties and the average registered property
size had doubled after three years in the program and the municipality subsequently decreased the
average property tax rate by nearly 50%, tax collection nevertheless increased substantially. See the web
appendix for more details.
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taxpayer. This would lead to tax revenues being spent more on education infras-
tructure if taxpayers favor education spending more than (poorer) non taxpayers,
in line with evidence in Bursztyn (2013) that middle-income individuals demand
more education spending than low-income individuals in Brazil. This qualifies
the external validity of the results in this paper: they indicate that increases in
tax revenues due to improvements in tax capacity are spent better than increases
in non-tax revenues. This type of increases in tax revenues is probably the most
relevant in developing countries in which future increases in public revenues are
more likely to come from increases in governments’ capacity to tax than from
higher tax rates (Gordon and Li, 2009, Besley and Persson, 2013).
VII. Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of a Brazilian local tax capacity program and dis-
continuities in the rule allocating federal transfers to municipalities to study how
governments spend increases in public revenues from different sources. Results
suggest that local governments use the increase in taxes thanks to the program to
provide more education infrastructure than they do when faced with an increase
in transfer revenues of the same amount.
This paper is admittedly limited in its capacity to test whether tax and trans-
fer revenues would be spent differently by all governments - I can only directly
compare the impact of they two types of revenues on a sub-sample of Brazilian
municipalities - lending a cautionary note to drawing strong policy inference. N-
evertheless, the results show that increasing the capacity to tax of Brazilian local
governments that express an interest in raising tax revenues has a larger impact
on locally provided public infrastructure than giving non-earmarked grants to
the average government. As such, these results speak directly to considerations
about the right form of decentralization. The existence of a large ‘fiscal gap’
between local expenditure responsibilities and local tax revenues is an ubiquitous
characteristic of local governments around the developing world. The evidence p-
resented here suggests that local tax collection is a necessary feature of successful
decentralization. Moving up from the local government level, they support the
idea that ‘tax capacity building’ is a form of development assistance that may lead
to more public investments in human capital infrastructure than budget support
assistance.
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Figure 1. Tax capacity (PMAT) program: distribution of application and start dates
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Notes: Each bar represents the number of municipalities applying to (top panel) or starting
(bottom panel) the tax capacity program in a given year. The sample includes the 339 munici-
palities that take part in the program.
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Figure 2. Real and predicted non-tax revenues per capita as a function of population
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Notes: Real (left panel) and predicted (right panel) FPM transfer revenues per capita as a
function of estimated municipal population in the previous year, local polynomial smoothing
(in red) performed separately in each interval between two cutoffs. The sample includes all
municipalities with less than 142,633 inhabitants and more than 6,792 inhabitants that are not
state capitals over the period 1998-2011.
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Figure 3. Evolution of municipal tax revenues in PMAT vs non-PMAT municipalities
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Notes: Each point on the (solid) green line represents the impact on tax revenues per capita of
having been in the program for j years (for j > 0) or of starting the program in j years (j < 0),
estimated following equation (5). The vertical line at j = −1 indicates the reference year. The
points on the (dashed) blue lines represent the 95% interval for the estimates. The top panel
compares all PMAT municipalities to non-PMAT municipalities, the bottom panel compares the
57 PMAT municipalities that waited two years between applying to and starting the program
to non-PMAT municipalities.
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Figure 4. Evolution of municipal education infrastructure (quantity) in PMAT vs non-PMAT
municipalities
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Notes: See notes to Figure 3. The Figure plots estimates obtained by estimating equation (5)
using the number of classrooms in use in municipal schools per thousand school-age inhabitants
as dependent variable.
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Figure 5. Evolution of municipal education infrastructure (quality) in PMAT vs non-PMAT
municipalities
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Notes: See notes to Figure 3. The Figure plots estimates obtained by estimating equation (5)
using the index of municipal school quality as dependent variable.
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Figure 6. Transfer revenues per capita as a function of municipal population
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Notes: Each point represents residual transfer revenues per capita as a function of normalized
municipal population in the previous year averaged over 50 inhabitant bins (population size
is normalized as the distance from the above or below threshold; symmetric intervals with no
municipality in more than one interval). Residuals are obtained from a regression of transfer
revenues per capita on municipality and year fixed effects and a set of 14 segment dummies. The
central (green) line is a spline polynomial in population size fitted separately on each side of the
pooled cutoff, the top and bottom (blue) lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The sample
includes all municipalities that are not state capitals and with a population of less than 142,632
inhabitants and more than 6,792 inhabitants over the period 1998-2011.
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Figure 7. Municipal education infrastructure (quantity) as a function of municipal popula-
tion
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Notes: Each point represents the residual number of municipal classrooms divided by school
age population as a function of normalized municipal population in the previous year averaged
over 50 inhabitant bins. See notes to Figure 6.
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Figure 8. Municipal education infrastructure (quality) as a function of municipal population
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Notes: Each point represents the index of municipal school quality as a function of normalized
municipal population in the previous year averaged over 50 inhabitant bins. See notes to Figure
6.
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Table 1—Hazard model of the probability of applying to the program
1 2 3 4
GDP per capita 0.187*** 0.178*** 0.186*** 0.186***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Share services in GDP -0.130 -0.157 -0.133 -0.098
(0.170) (0.180) (0.171) (0.186)
Population 2.029*** 3.076*** 2.027*** -0.700
(0.448) (1.130) (0.449) (2.269)
Urban population (%) 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Taxes pc -0.010 -0.020 -0.007 0.018
(0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027)
Distance to closest PMAT -0.024** -0.021 -0.024** -0.022*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Time 0.401*** 0.282*** 0.401*** 0.415***
(0.053) (0.071) (0.054) (0.059)
Municipal education infra: quantity -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Municipal education infra: quality 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Municipal health infra 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inequality -0.581 -0.945* -0.588 -1.123**
(0.474) (0.506) (0.476) (0.506)
Last term -0.117* -0.147** -0.116* -0.126*
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.065)
Mayor’s education 0.025***
(0.009)
∆ Taxes pc t− 1 0.055
(0.116)
∆ GDP pc t− 1 0.104
(0.262)
∆ Population t− 1 -0.276
(0.861)
∆ Taxes pc 96-98 -0.001
(0.001)
∆ Population 96-99 -0.000
(0.000)
∆ GDP pc 96-98 0.001
(0.008)
Observations 54502 42974 54502 42713
Municipalities 4565 4565 4565 3395
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 0 as long as the municipality has
not applied to the program and 1 the year it applies. Municipalities that have already
applied are dropped. The sample starts in 1999 and excludes the 13 municipalities that
applied in 1998. Observations prior to 2001 are excluded from column 2 because the
mayor’s education was not measured in the term 1996-2000, observations for which 1996
information is not available are excluded from column 4. All variables are measured
in 1998 except municipal health infrastructure (1999) inequality and urban population
(2000 Census), political variables (which change after each election) and lagged taxes,
GDP and population. Tax and revenues are measured in 100 Rs. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance at the 10% level is represented
by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 2—Descriptive statistics of municipalities by program participation status in year 1998
PMAT Non PMAT Non PMAT, Common support
Tax revenues (Rs per capita) 94.35 36.24 105.9
(98.77) (90.61) (225.8)
Non-tax (FPM) revenues (Rs per capita) 85.25 180.4 90.07
(51.72) (113.4) (45.93)
Total municipal revenues (Rs per capita) 452.9 483.6 482.8
(203.9) (1077.3) (370.4)
Population 153.9 19.34 135.7
(583.9) (44.11) (196.4)
Municipal education infra: quantity 9.187 14.95 9.734
(4.744) (7.698) (5.381)
Municipal education infra: quality -0.498 -1.269 -0.644
(1.295) (1.163) (1.198)
Municipal health infra (1999) 23.38 39.75 23.42
(18.07) (30.07) (18.10)
GDP (Rs per capita) 588.1 360.9 615.4
(431.2) (343.6) (661.6)
Share services in GDP (%) 64.4 61 63.9
(12.7) (14.9) (15.2)
Urban population (%) (2000) 84.19 60.19 83.93
(17.40) (23.25) (16.79)
Gini index (2000) 0.553 0.557 0.549
(0.0540) (0.0572) (0.0529)
Life expectancy (2000) 71.07 68.11 70.12
(3.182) (4.778) (3.840)
Median education level (2000) 5.624 4.076 5.370
(1.278) (1.209) (1.237)
Local radio station 0.720 0.294 0.695
(0.450) (0.456) (0.461)
Local judiciary seat 0.802 0.426 0.777
(0.399) (0.495) (0.417)
Municipalities 339 4239 3448
Corruption data from Brollo et al. (2013)
Broad corruption index (2003) 0.625 0.663 0.561
(0.518) (0.474) (0.498)
Narrow corruption index (2003) 0.375 0.362 0.237
(0.518) (0.483) (0429)
Municipalities 8 116 112
Corruption data from Litschig and Zamboni (2012)
All irregularities index (2003) 20.45 41.5 17.6
(29.57) (49.91) (25.64)
Diversion irregularities index (2003) 0.358 1.477 0.499
(0.676) (2.083) (1.036)
Mismanagement irregularities index (2003) 7.541 17.032 7.379
(10.376) (20.097) (10.461)
Municipalities 15 205 174
Notes: Mean (standard error). The samples are 1)first column: all municipalities that start a PMAT
program between 1998 and 2009 2) second column: all municipalities that never start a PMAT program
3) third column: all municipalities that never start a PMAT program and belong to the common support
sample (see text). Observations in the third column are weighted by a function of their propensity score.
All variables are measured in 1998 unless specified otherwise, when no 1998 data is available I use the first
year for which the variable is available. The quantity of municipal education infrastructure is the number
of classrooms per school-age inhabitants, the quality of education infrastructure the index constructed
from school characteristics (see text) and municipal health infrastructure is the number of health units per
100,000 inhabitants.
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Table 3—Impact of tax revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole sample Whole sample Common support Mayor fixed effect PMAT only
A: First Stage - Impact of the program on tax revenues
Program 13.547*** 11.630*** 10.329*** 9.953***
(2.405) (2.558) (2.417) (2.501)
Has applied -0.695 0.417 0.501 0.499 -0.035
(2.122) (2.167) (0.918) (1.899) (0.150)
Years in the program 3.201***
(1.303)
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57507 57507 46661 57507 4600
Clusters 4578 4578 3724 13146 339
B: Second stage - Impact of tax revenues on municipal education infrastructure
Dependent variable: Quantity of municipal education infrastructure
Tax revenues 0.356*** 0.470*** 0.319* 0.454** 0.403***
(0.138) (0.181) (0.179) (0.182) (0.174)
Has applied -0.084 -0.248 -0.155 0.142 0.067
(0.092) (0.169) (0.142) (0.141) (0.079)
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57507 57507 46661 57507 4600
Clusters 4578 4578 3724 13146 339
Dependent variable: Quality of municipal education infrastructure
Tax revenues 0.114*** 0.117** 0.136** 0.130** 0.141**
(0.040) (0.048) (0.055) (0.058) (0.062)
Has applied -0.040 -0.042 0.041 0.012 -0.006
(0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.044) (0.051)
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57507 57507 46660 57507 4600
Clusters 4578 4578 3724 13146 339
Notes: Dependent variables are municipal tax revenues per capita (panel A), the number of classrooms in municipal
schools per thousand school-age inhabitants (panel B.1) and the index of quality of municipal schools (panel B.2).
In panels B.1 and B.2 the indicator for program participation is used as an instrument for tax revenues per capita in
columns 1 to 4, and the number of years in the tax capacity program is the instrument in column 5. Tax revenues are
per capita and in units of 10 Rs in the two bottom panels. All specifications include an indicator for having applied
to the program and year fixed effects, columns 1-3 and 5 include municipality fixed effects, column 4 municipal
administration fixed effects and columns 2-5 include time-varying controls. The sample in column 3 is the common
support sample and non-PMAT municipalities are weighted by a function of their estimated propensity score. The
sample in column 5 is only PMAT municipalities. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality
level. Statistical significance at the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 4—Impact of non-tax revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2% sample 2% sample 5% sample 5% sample Whole sample
Polynomial specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Third-order
A: First Stage - Impact of the allocation rule on non-tax revenues
All cutoffs 12.501*** 11.928*** 13.632*** 12.995*** 14.382***
(0.991) (0.761) (0.668) (0.511) (0.710)
Covariates and municipality FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5231 5231 13193 13193 35426
Clusters 1692 1692 2000 2000 2930
B: Second Stage - Impact of non-tax revenues on municipal education infrastructure
Dependent variable: Quantity of municipal education infrastructure
All cutoffs 0.195 -0.084 0.022 -0.045 -0.068
(0.191) (0.085) (0.127) (0.056) (0.071)
Covariates and municipality FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5231 5231 13193 13193 35426
Clusters 1692 1692 2000 2000 2930
Dependent variable: Quality of municipal education infrastructure
All cutoffs 0.050 0.036 -0.036 -0.011 -0.005
(0.061) (0.026) (0.038) (0.016) (0.019)
Covariates and municipality FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5231 5231 13193 13193 35426
Clusters 1692 1692 2000 2000 2930
Notes: Dependent variables are municipal FPM revenues per capita (panel A), the number of classrooms
in municipal schools per thousand school-age inhabitants (panel B.1) and the index of quality of municipal
schools (panel B.2). All specifications include year fixed effects and control flexibly for population size, using
local linear regressions in columns 1-4 and a spline third-order polynomial in the last column, and exclude
municipalities with a population of more than 142,633 or less than 6,792 inhabitants over the period 1998-
2011. Covariates are municipality fixed effects, GDP per capita, the share of agriculture and services in GDP,
municipal population and political characteristics of the municipality. The sample includes all municipalities
within a 2% bandwidth of a population cutoff in the first two columns, a 5% bandwidth in columns 3 and 4
and all municipalities within the bracket mid-points around a cutoff in the last column. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance at the 10% level is represented by
∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 5—IV results - Impact of a 10 Rs increase in tax or non-tax revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Mayor fixed effect Close to cutoffs only Common support
A: Quantity of municipal education infrastructure
Non-tax revenue -0.110 0.047 -0.089 -0.089
(0.084) (0.086) (0.076) (0.078)
Tax revenue 0.509** 0.543** 0.403 0.395*
(0.240) (0.247) (0.262) (0.203)
Observations 35426 35426 13193 34747
Clusters 2930 8024 2000 2858
T-test p-value 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.03
B: Quality of municipal education infrastructure
Non-tax revenue 0.018 -0.006 -0.021 -0.020
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022)
Tax revenue 0.124** 0.133* 0.133 0.114**
(0.061) (0.071) (0.085) (0.057)
Observations 35426 35426 13193 34747
Clusters 2930 8024 2000 2858
T-test p-value 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.04
C: Total municipal spending
Non-tax revenue 10.001*** 10.991*** 10.108*** 10.685***
(0.354) (0.701) (0.411) (0.629)
Tax revenue 10.832*** 12.306*** 11.213*** 12.356***
(0.817) (1.236) (0.885) (1.121)
Observations 35426 35426 13193 34747
Clusters 2930 8024 2000 2858
T-test p-value 0.37 0.34 0.24 0.17
Notes: The dependent variables are the number of classrooms in municipal schools per thousand
school-age inhabitants (panel A), the index of quality of municipal schools (panel B) and municipal
spending per capita (panel C). Transfer and tax revenues are per capita and in units of 10 Rs when
used as dependent variables (columns 3 and 4). Program participation and an indicator equal to
one if lagged population is above a population cutoff are used as instruments for tax revenues and
transfer revenues. All specifications include year and time-varying controls as well as an indicator
equal to 1 if the municipality has applied to the program but not started yet, columns 1,3 and 4
include municipality fixed effects and column 2 municipal administration fixed effect. All specifications
exclude municipalities not affected by the transfer allocation rule, ie observations with a population of
more than 142,633 inhabitants or below 6,792. Columns 1 and 2 use the entire sample, column 3 all
municipalities within a 5% bandwidth of the population thresholds and column 4 the common support
sample. Column 3 controls for population linearly on both sides of each cutoff, other columns include
spline cubic polynomial in population size which allow for different slopes on both sides of each cutoff.
In Column 4 non-PMAT municipalities are weighted by a function of their estimated propensity score.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance at the
10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
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Table 6—Results on municipalities that join the program only
Outcome variable Tax revenues Non-tax revenues Quantity of educ. infra. Quality of educ. infra.
A: Impact of tax and non-tax revenues on PMAT municipalities only
First stage: increases in tax and non-tax revenues
Years in the program 3.516***
(1.259)
All cutoffs 10.104***
(1.451)
Second stage: impact of tax and non-tax revenues
Non-tax revenues 0.010 -0.039
(0.500) (0.098)
Tax revenues per capita 0.409*** 0.152**
(0.163) (0.072)
Observations 3448 3448 3448 3448
Clusters 257 257 257 257
B: Impact of non-tax revenues on PMAT municipalities after the start of the program
Non-tax revenues -0.245 0.001
(0.180) (0.088)
Observations 1870 1870
Clusters 249 249
Notes: The dependent variables are non-tax revenues per capita (column 1), tax revenues per capita (column 2), the
number of classrooms in municipal schools per thousand school-age inhabitants (column 3) and the index of quality of
municipal schools (column 4). The sample includes all observations for municipalities that take part in the program
at some point between 1998 and 2009, are not state capitals and have a population of less than 142,633 and more
than 6,792 over the period. In Panel the sample includes all observations for these municipalities, in Panel B only
observations after the start of the program. Non-tax and tax revenues are per capita and in units of 10 Rs when
used as explanatory variables, and in units of 1 Rs when used as dependent variables, to facilitate comparison with
the results above. The number of years in the program and an indicator equal to one if lagged population is above a
population cutoff are used as instruments for tax revenues and non-tax revenues, specifications in the bottom panel
control for the number of years a municipality has been taking part in the program. All specifications include year and
time-varying controls as well as an indicator equal to 1 if the municipality has applied to the program but not started
yet, municipality fixed effects and spline cubic polynomial in population size which allow for different slopes on both
sides of each cutoff. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance at
the 10% level is represented by ∗, at the 5% level by ∗∗, and at the 1% level by ∗∗∗.
